A whistleblower’s worst nightmare

Justice is supposed to be blind. But what happens when it turns out to be blind, deaf and dumb?

Sadly, there is not enough space here to tell you the entire 7-year saga of whistleblower Michael Winston, but the bottom line is this: He got royally screwed by the California judicial system.

Winston, 62, is a mild-mannered Ph.D. and a veteran leadership executive who has held top jobs at elite corporations such as McDonnell Douglas, Motorola and Merrill Lynch. After taking time off to nurse his ailing parents, Winston was recruited by Countrywide Financial to help polish their corporate Image. He was quickly promoted — twice — and had a team of 200 employees.

It’s almost unheard of for a top-tier executive turning whistleblower, but that’s what Winston became after he noticed many of his staff were sickened by noxious air in their Simi…

Lead counsel Neil Barofsky, the former Special Inspector General of TARP,  and is firm doing this case pro bono, with the potential provision of fees by the court if they win the case.

From freelance writer David Dayen of Naked Capitalism:

Late on Friday, a coalition of African-American, Latino and Asian-American groups sued California Governor Jerry Brown, demanding that he return $350 million stolen from the state’s share of the National Mortgage Settlement to plug a budget hole.

California is far from the only state to divert money given as a penalty for homeowner abuse into the General Fund; in fact, less than half of the $2.5 billion given to states in the settlement actually went to housing (and that’s a generous rendering which counts things like North Dakota spending to increase housing stock in oil country for police officers, when that has nothing to do with compensation for abuse)…

US Bank vs. Phillips: Bank ignores court orders in a foreclosure case—CASE DISMISSED!

MR. WEIDNER: And just one other
11 point. The court reporter was here. That’s
12 another important point, that they managed to
13 have a court reporter here. They didn’t manage
14 to have an attorney here.
15 My client is here. We’re entitled to
16 dismissal because they have repeatedly failed to
17 comply with your order.
18 They haven’t cited an appropriate
19 basis for rehearing, period. So you shouldn’t
20 rehear it. The case should stand dismissed.

USBank vs Phillips_02-27-14_Jdg Minkoff_FullSize

Prosecutors May Seek Larger Penalty For Countrywide Exec Behind “Hustle” Scam

Last fall, Bank of America and former Countrywide executive Rebecca Mairone were found liable in federal court over a Countrywide scam that had bilked bailed-out mortgage-backers Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac out of piles of cash by selling them worthless mortgages. Mairone was originally expected to face a $1.1 million penalty, but that was before she got a big bonus from her new gig.

While at Countrywide, Mairone was in charge of the High Speed Swim Lane program — better known as the “Hustle” — a plan that removed many of the roadblocks in the mortgage underwriting process that are intended to prevent lenders from issuing loans to borrowers who can’t repay. The notion, alleged prosecutors, was that Countrywide was trying to package up and sell as many loans as possible to Fannie and Freddie under the pretense…

This video describes the entire MBS manufacturing process and the important role Fannie Mae plays in the mortgage finance circle that connects borrowers, lenders, Fannie Mae, and investors.

US Rep. Marcy Kaptur: “LOOK AT THOSE OVER AT THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT AND WHERE THEY WORKED BEFORE THEY GOT THERE”
WE NEED TO LOOK AT THOSE OVER AT THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT AND WHERE THEY WORKED BEFORE THEY GOT THERE BECAUSE I THINK ONE OF THE REASONS PROSECUTION ISN’T THE LEVEL THAT IT SHOULD THERE IS SOME PARALYSIS IN SOME PLACES BECAUSE OF THOSE WHO ARE ABLE TO BLOCK A PLAY.

US Rep. Marcy Kaptur: “LOOK AT THOSE OVER AT THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT AND WHERE THEY WORKED BEFORE THEY GOT THERE”

A publicly shamed audit: Justice Department, FBI, failed to jail mortgage fraudsters

Between 2009 to 2011, leadership at the Department of Justice stated publicly and repeatedly that tackling mortgage fraud was a top priority.

Today, that department’s Inspector General released an audit and concluded, despite the above claim, there is little proof the promise of high-levels of mortgage fraud prosecution ever took place.

“We… determined during this audit that DOJ did not uniformly ensure that mortgage fraud was prioritized at a level commensurate with its public statements,” said the audit, released today from Inspector General Michael Horowitz.

What did take place, however, was a high level of mishandling and lack of efficient law enforcement from a judicial level to effectively prosecute mortgage fraud cases, according to the audti.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation criminal investigative division in particular was lacking in prioritizing mortgage fraud. Despite nearly $200 million in funding…

As the dust from the financial crisis begins to settle, we learn that the lack of IRS enforcement of themortgage-backed securities industry bears blame for the financial crisis. The financial crisis began when lenders started making bad loans on a large-scale basis in the late ’90s and early ’00s. Big banks purchased these bad loans, bundled them into trusts, and sold interests in the trusts to investors worldwide. The interests in the trusts are mortgage-backed securities. The investors (financial institutions, pension and retirement plans, insurance companies, state and local governments and individuals) did not know the loans were bad, and paid inflated prices for the mortgage-backed securities. Now that the practices of lenders and banks are coming to light, borrowers and investors are seeking to recover losses through lawsuits. And it is obvious that better practices, as required by tax law and enforced through IRS audit, would have prevented or mitigated those losses.

Mortgage-backed securities are a vital part…

No, Americans Are Not All To Blame for the Financial Crisis: Exposing the big lie of the post-crash economy

mong my favorite anecdotes of the mortgage-industry decadence that preceded the global financial crisis is the one about Ameriquest’s wind machine. A motivational tool for managers, it made its appearance in the late ’90s at an executive conference at Las Vegas’s MGM Grand Hotel, where the future subprime leader hooked up a powerful fan to a plastic tent. Inside, exuberant branch managers jumped around amid a cascade of cash, allowed to keep as many swirling bills as they could grab.

That was how it went at mortgage-firm retreats: Here, a money-grabbing contest; there, a round of ritual chanting—“The power of yes! The power of yes!”—at a 2004 Washington Mutual gathering that was like the high ceremony of some bizarre money cult. Before long such incentivizing was part of the daily…