I’m still questioning whether the investors’ finance directors and fund managers, CEOs knew or were told not worry that these mortgage loans would be liquid and that the foreclosures were insured. Unlike the homeowner, the investors had all sort of warnings…but, had they done their due diligence they would have found that there were no assignments of mortgages and notes to the trust. Knew or should have known? The homeowners were unwittingly induced into providing their collateral. The investors, however, had much more opportunity to smell a rat and apparently chose to overlook it. Why? And why isn’t the spotlight on the investor finance directors?
Bloomberg Reports that the big banks are borrowing big time money using money market funds as source money for financing repurchase agreements. This stirs the obvious conclusion that the mortgage bonds — and hence the claim on underlying loans — are in constant movement making the proof problems in foreclosure proceedings difficult at best.
The underlying theme is that there is tremendous pressure to make good on the mortgage bonds that never actually existed issued by REMIC trusts that were never actually funded who made claims on loans that never actually existed. All that is why I say you should argue away from the presumption and keep the burden of persuasion or burden of proof on the party who has exclusive access to the actual proof of payment and proof of loss.
The banks are still claiming assets on their balance sheet that are either without value of any kind…
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Deadly Clear 